We develop a model of competition for managerial talent in which firms asymmetrically learn about the ability of their managers. In equilibrium, firms actively attempt and succeed at poaching talent from competitors, even in the absence of gains from trade. Our main result is that firms inefficiently chase lemons: some poached managers are less productive at their new jobs. Our model provides an equilibrium explanation for the apparent lack of portability of talent observed among some finance workers, such as equity analysts and mutual fund managers. We also show that poaching is more prevalent when firms are more heterogeneous, managerial skills are more general, and the distribution of talent is more skewed.
Introduction
The main assets of …nancial services …rms are organizational capital and human capital. It is thus unsurprising that such …rms compete aggressively for talent. 1 Indeed, talent poaching is widespread in the …nancial sector. 2 Despite this fact, evidence of the bene…ts from poaching …nance workers is elusive. Berk, van Binsbergen, and Liu (2017) show that mutual fund managers who move to other …rms are not as skilled as those who stay. The authors argue that …rms have private information about the skill of their managers, implying that managers who are successfully poached are adversely selected. Groysberg, Lee, and Nanda (2008) show similar evidence in the context of security analysis: The performance of analysts who are successfully poached by competitors declines after analysts switch employers. The authors attribute this …nding to the relevance of …rm-speci…c skills.
While both asymmetric information and …rm-speci…c skills can explain the apparent lack of talent portability, a puzzle remains: If talent is not very portable, why do …rms poach employees from their competitors? Why would managers become less productive in their new jobs? In other words, why do …rms "chase lemons"? Commenting on Groysberg, Lee, and Nanda (2008) , Oyer and Schaefer (2011, p. 1804 ) describe this puzzle succinctly: "There may be substantial …rm-speci…city in analyst skills that is lost upon job mobility. It is also possible that this is evidence of a winner's curse stemming from asymmetric learning. It is not clear how this set of facts is consistent with equilibrium behavior by market participants."
In this paper, we develop a model in which …rms compete for knowledge workers (such as fund managers, security analysts, etc.). Knowledge workers -whom we call managers, for brevity -have both general and …rm-speci…c skills. Firms are heterogeneous and di¤er in quality (i.e., productivity or scale). Managerial talent and …rm quality are technological complements. 3 Learning is asymmetric: Firms acquire private information about the talent of their incumbent managers, while competing employers can only observe public information.
The model predicts that …rms typically retain their very best managers because less-1 For evidence of the importance of competition for talent and demand for managerial skills in the …nancial sector, see Philippon and Reshef (2012) and Célérier and Vallée (2018) . 2 For anecdotal evidence of the increasing incidence of talent poaching in the …nancial sector in recent years, see, e.g., Morrell (2018) . More generally, show that jobto-job transitions are an important empirical phenomenon, accounting for approximately half of all employee reallocations across a number of sectors. 3 For evidence of strong complementarities between …rm scale and talent in …nance, see Célérier and Vallée (2018). informed competitors are unable to separate top managers from mediocre ones. Because of …rm-speci…c skills, even low-quality …rms are able to retain some of their top talent.
Although …rms' ability to retain talent negatively a¤ects job mobility, in our model the market for managerial talent is very active, and there are signi…cant job-to-job ‡ows of managers in each period. Because …rms always retain the best managers, poached managers are adversely selected; that is, poached managers are mediocre managers. Asymmetric learning also implies that …rms play an important role in discovering talent. By retaining only managers whose talent is above a certain threshold, …rms certify that their employed managers have above-average talent. Poachers are happy to hire mediocre managers, i.e., those who are above average but not stars, if the alternative is to hire an unproven manager.
Mediocre managers are adversely selected with respect to the set of employed managers while, at the same time, being positively selected relative to the population as a whole.
A unique feature of our model, when compared to traditional asymmetric information models, is that job-to-job ‡ows can be ine¢ cient: some managers become less productive after switching …rms. Our model thus displays an equilibrium in which …rms rationally chase lemons, here de…ned as managers who become less productive after moving to higher-quality …rms. That is, there are positive job-to-job ‡ows in equilibrium, even in the absence of gains from trade. Our results may appear surprising in light of the original analysis of markets with asymmetric information by Akerlof (1970) . In a lemons market in which the seller of an asset has private information, there is typically little or no trade. By analogy, one would expect that a labor market in which the current employer knows more about the quality of its worker than a competitor is likely to generate too little "trade," i.e., insu¢ cient worker mobility. However, this analogy is imperfect for two reasons. First, matching considerations are important in labor markets, implying that low worker mobility is sometimes e¢ cient.
Second, workers are not like assets, which can be freely bought and sold. Assuming no slavery, a worker is free to work for the highest bidder, and the current employer typically receives no compensation if the worker is poached by another …rm. In this context, and in contrast with traditional lemons market models, in our model there is typically "too much trade."
In addition to providing an explanation for the puzzling behavior of chasing lemons, our model is rich in empirical predictions. The model implies the existence of job ladders in knowledge-based occupations: Job-to-job ‡ows are typically from low-quality and low-wage …rms to high-quality and high-wage …rms. The model also predicts that managerial turnover increases with …rm heterogeneity, the importance of general skills, and the skewness of the distribution of talent, as well as that within-job compensation growth increases with …rm heterogeneity.
Our theory is not meant to be a general theory of labor markets. Our analysis is relevant for understanding situations in which informational asymmetries a¤ect talent discovery. Hacamo and Kleiner (2018) show empirically that social networks can reduce informational asymmetries and improve a …rm's access to the managerial labor market. Consistent with employers having an informational advantage at discovering talent, Tate and Yang (2015) show evidence that …rms use internal labor markets to allocate talent across divisions e¢ciently. Groen-Xu and Lü (2019) show evidence that boards use their private information about CEOs when setting compensation. 4
Our paper adds to the growing theoretical literature on …nancial-sector labor markets.
This literature has focused on issues such as the level and composition of pay, the allocation of talent, and market failures. Examples include Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991) , Philippon (2010) , Glode, Green and Lowery (2012) , Thanassoulis (2012) , Bond and Glode (2014) , Axelson and Bond (2015) , Biais and Landier (2015) , Bolton, Santos, and Scheinkman (2016) , Glode and Lowery (2016) , Acharya, Pagano, and Volpin (2016) , Bénabou and Tirole (2016) , Van Wesep and Waters (2018) , and Berk and van Binsbergen (2019) . Our model di¤ers from these previous works by focusing on the consequences of asymmetric learning about talent.
Our analysis also shares certain ideas with those found in models of executive markets. As in …rm-CEO assignment models, managers and …rms are heterogeneous (Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier, 2009; Eisfeldt and Kuhnen, 2013; Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Terviö, 2008) .
As in Frydman (2016) , managers are endowed with both …rm-speci…c and general skills. As in Edmans and Gabaix (2011) , the process of matching managers with …rms is distorted by informational frictions. 4 There is an important empirical literature in labor economics on asymmetric employer learning. Gibbons and Katz (1991) provide empirical evidence compatible with the predictions of a model of layo¤s with asymmetric employer learning. Schönberg (2007) …nds evidence of asymmetric employer learning for college graduates. Pinkston (2009) constructs a model in which …rms use bidding wars to compete for talent and …nds empirical evidence of substantial asymmetric employer learning. Kahn (2013) tests two predictions of an asymmetric employer learning model: (i) the variance of wage changes is higher for stayers than for movers and (ii) an increase in the degree of informational asymmetry decreases the variance of wage changes more for movers than for stayers. She …nds substantial evidence in favor of asymmetric learning.
Our model has its origins in the asymmetric employer learning literature, which was initiated by Waldman (1984) and Greenwald (1986) . 5 In such models, the current employer learns about the talent of incumbent workers, while competing employers remain uninformed.
Our model di¤ers from the standard model in this literature because we introduce a speci…c form of …rm heterogeneity: Some …rms are more productive than others. 6 This feature allows us to study job-to-job ‡ows in equilibrium and delivers our main result: Adversely selected job-to-job ‡ows. More generally, our paper is related to the literature on adverse selection in markets initiated by Akerlof (1970) . This literature typically focuses on the impact of private information about the quality of a good on the occurrence of trade. 7
There is also a literature on symmetric learning in labor economics. In this literature, the paper most closely related to ours is Terviö (2009) , who also shows that competition for talent creates ine¢ ciencies. In his model, a worker's talent is revealed on the job, but -unlike in our model -this information is public. Terviö shows that, in a competitive labor market, …rms invest too little in talent discovery and over-recruit workers with mediocre abilities. In contrast, we show that asymmetric information restores …rms'incentives to invest in talent discovery.
Model Setup and Timing
We …rst present a simple two-period version of the model, which we use to derive our main results. In Section 5, we present an overlapping-generations model, in which the two-period 5 The theoretical labor literature on asymmetric employer learning has focused on a number of di¤erent applications, such as the signaling e¤ects of promotion and retention decisions (Waldman, 1984; Lazear, 1986; Milgrom and Oster, 1987; Ricart I Costa, 1988; Laing, 1994; Bernhardt and Scoones, 1993; Bernhardt, 1995; Golan, 2005; Li, 2013; Waldman and Zax, 2016) , the optimal design of disclosure policies (Mukherjee, 2008) , and investing in general and/or …rm-speci…c skills (Waldman, 1990; Chang and Wang, 1996; Pischke, 1998, 1999) . 6 Dispersion in productivity and pro…tability has been widely documented. A large body of strategy literature attributes pro…tability dispersion to monopoly pro…ts, which are explained by barriers to entry or ownership of unique resources (McGahan and Porter, 1997; Rumelt, 1991) . Even in industries with free entry, equilibrium (ex post) productivity dispersion can be explained by the accumulation of organizational capital (Atkeson and Kehoe, 2005) . For a review of the literature on productivity dispersion, see Syverson (2011). 7 For example, Ellingsen (1997) shows that there exists a separating equilibrium in which some trade of high-quality goods occurs in markets for lemons. Levin (2001) studies how the degree of information asymmetry a¤ects trade. Adriani and Deidda (2009) consider a case in which a seller values a low-quality good more than the buyer does. Daley and Green (2012) and Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2015) develop dynamic models of adverse selection and its impact on trade. Bar-Isaac, Jewitt, and Leaver (2014) study how the degree of information asymmetry impacts e¢ ciency when public and private information is multi-dimensional. model of this section is repeated in…nitely. The in…nite-horizon model has a more natural interpretation and delivers the same predictions as the simpler two-period model.
The economy is populated with a continuum of …rms and a continuum of agents (e.g., fund managers, security analysts, etc.), which for simplicity we refer to as managers, that live for two periods, t = 0; 1. Firms can be of one of two types, L or H, representing both the type and the mass of …rms of each type. We denote a …rm of each type by i 2 fl; hg. Firm i has productivity parameter i . Low-quality …rms -L …rms -have parameter l = 1, and high-quality …rms -H …rms -have parameter h = , where > 1. Productivity di¤erences are the only source of (exogenous) heterogeneity between …rms. For each type i 2 fl; hg, we use subscripts ji to denote a unique …rm j of type i.
Managers are endowed with general (i.e., portable) talent distributed according to a di¤erentiable cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) F (:) with support [0; ] and mean .
A …rm of type i that employs a manager with talent produces revenue i if the manager has already worked for the …rm in a previous period and i if the manager is newly hired. 8 Parameter 2 (0; 1) represents the loss in …rm-speci…c skills that results when an outsider replaces an incumbent manager. Higher levels of indicate that …rm-speci…c skills are less important.
At t = 0, a mass M H + L of managers enters the labor market. Each …rm (of either type, L or H) hires one manager from the pool of available managers. Firm j of type i o¤ers wage w y ji to a young manager. Because all managers are ex ante observationally identical, the initial pairing of …rms and managers is random. Since jobs are in short supply, some managers remain unemployed.
At t = 1, each …rm learns the talent of its incumbent manager. Managers do not observe . Our interpretation of this assumption is that a …rm has a better signal of its manager's ability than the manager herself. For example, could represent skills speci…c to the industry, and an experienced executive might be better at assessing the value of such skills than a manager in the early stages of their career. 9 This assumption excludes the possibility of managers signaling their types to potential employers. It also rules out the possibility of potential employers screening managers through a menu of contracts. We choose to rule out these possibilities in order to focus on the role of asymmetric information among employers.
Our approach has the advantage of making clear precisely what informational assumptions are required for the results. In contrast, the literature on employer learning typically adopts a di¤erent approach that imposes exogenous restrictions on actions -and sometimes on the space of contracts -to eliminate screening and employee signaling.
We also assume that a …rm's payo¤ is not directly observable and thus remains private information to the …rm. One interpretation is that performance is observed only with noise, which could occur for a number of reasons, such as insu¢ cient disclosure, imperfect measurement of the performance of complex tasks, di¢ culties in measuring a manager's individual contribution to the output of a team, or any other similar confounding e¤ects. In all such cases, the …rm could have an informational advantage over outsiders when estimating the performance of managers because the …rm can directly observe a manager's actions.
At the beginning of t = 1, all players face the following timing:
Date 1. Each …rm j of type i learns the type ji 2 [0; ] of its incumbent manager and independently commits to a wage o¤er w ji 2 R to this incumbent manager. We permit strictly negative wage o¤ers. As these o¤ers will not be accepted, a negative wage o¤er is equivalent to dismissing the incumbent manager. When …rms o¤er a negative wage, managers quit immediately, thus creating vacancies. A vacancy is created, for example, if < . In this case, a …rm prefers a randomly selected unemployed manager over its incumbent manager. 10
Date 2. After observing all wage o¤ers made by all …rms in the sector, a …rm j of type i with a vacancy makes o¤ers w p ji to managers from other …rms; all …rms act simultaneously. Importantly, …rms making poaching o¤ers do not observe the incumbent managers'types.
Instead, they form beliefs regarding these types after observing the set of all wage o¤ers made by incumbent …rms.
Date 3. A manager who holds o¤ers decides which o¤er, if any, to accept. Managers always agree to work for the maximum non-negative wage o¤ered to them:
Assumption A1 A manager who holds an o¤er w ji accepts all poaching o¤ers where w p ji > w ji and rejects all poaching o¤ers where w p ji w ji .
In other words, if indi¤erent, a manager stays with their current employer, which is a standard assumption in the literature (see, e.g., Waldman, 1984) . However, this assumption entails some loss of generality because it eliminates a number of equilibria in mixed strategies.
Thus, we consider (A1) an equilibrium selection criterion with intuitive properties: Managers may have a small bias against changing jobs because of unmodeled costs. 11 Date 4. All …rms with vacancies at this date randomly recruit one manager from the outside pool, which is de…ned as the set of unemployed managers available for hire. The outside pool exclusively comprises managers not employed at t = 0 (this is without loss of generality; in equilibrium, a …rm with a vacancy would never hire a manager who was dismissed by another …rm). 12 The outside option of an unemployed manager is normalized to zero.
Date 5. Payo¤s are realized.
The timing assumes that …rms with vacancies move after o¤ers have been made to incumbent managers. Changing the timing such that …rms with incumbent managers move last renders retention easier but does not fundamentally a¤ect the qualitative properties of the equilibrium. 13 Finally, we assume away bonding contracts: A manager is free to work for the highest bidder, and the current employer receives no compensation if the manager is poached by another …rm. In such a market, an incumbent can only retain its manager by paying more than a competitor. There are no other contractual restrictions. In the Internet Appendix, we present a setting in which a …rm commits in t = 0 to a deferred compensation contract in which a manager is paid only at the end of the game. We show that such contracts, even when feasible, may not be voluntarily adopted by …rms.
To better understand the role of contractual assumptions for the implications of the model, in the Internet Appendix, we also consider the problem of a social planner who faces no exogenous restrictions on the set of mechanisms that can be chosen. We show that the main properties of the equilibrium do not depend on the particular contractual assumptions that we make. 11 Relaxing this assumption makes mixed-strategy equilibria possible. A complete characterization and discussion of mixed-strategy equilibria can be found in the Internet Appendix. 12 The implication of this assumption is that the distribution of talent in the outside pool is characterized by F (:). Nothing important changes if the unconditional c.d.f. of agents in the outside pool isF (:) 6 = F (:).
13 A complete analysis of the case in which incumbents move last can be found in the Internet Appendix. For a model in which incumbents and poachers move simultaneously, see Li (2013) .
Equilibrium
We now solve for the equilibrium. We focus on characterizing the equilibrium only at t = 1 because wage determination at t = 0 is a trivial problem. If there are no binding constraints on transfers from managers, …rms will choose a negative t = 0 wage to extract all future expected surpluses from managers. If instead such constraints exist, t = 0 wages will be set at the lowest level compatible with these constraints. In Section 5, we solve an in…nite-horizon version of the model in which, among other things, we characterize wages at all periods.
We make the following simplifying assumption:
This assumption is su¢ cient -but not necessary -to guarantee that poachable managers are always in short supply relative to the vacancies created in H …rms, which is the most interesting case to analyze. 14 Without loss of generality, we restrict the analysis to the case in which only H …rms make poaching o¤ers. This restriction is not binding in equilibrium because, for the same manager, H …rms would always make better o¤ers than L …rms.
We call an H …rm with a vacancy at Date 2 a poacher. Poachers compete à la Bertrand;
thus, their pro…ts from poaching a manager must equal their outside payo¤, .
Symmetric Information
In this subsection, we discuss the benchmark case of symmetric information, in which, at Date 1 of t = 1, all …rms learn about managers'talent. We then show that the allocation of talent obtained in a market equilibrium with symmetric information is e¢ cient.
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 1 A unique equilibrium exists where 1. L …rms …re all manager types lower than and retain all manager types in
(1)
H …rms …re all types lower than
and retain all types in [ ; ].
3. In L …rms, incumbent managers with types higher than # are poached by H …rms.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The equilibrium is such that there is a critical type # above which all manager types initially assigned to L …rms move to H …rms. All …rms …re all managers below threshold
. H …rms retain all managers above this threshold, while L …rms retain only mediocre managers, that is, managers in ; # .
In equilibrium, managers who move up the job ladder are the most talented ones. If initially allocated to low-quality …rms, such managers eventually move to high-quality …rms and earn higher wages. To verify whether the equilibrium outcome is e¢ cient, we consider what a social planner would choose. Because of …rm-speci…c skills, it is never e¢ cient to reallocate managers from one …rm to another when both …rms are of the same type. Similarly, transferring managers from H …rms to L …rms is always ine¢ cient. Thus, the planner needs to consider only the possibility of transferring managers from L …rms to H …rms.
To simplify the exposition, we refer to an L …rm with an incumbent manager at the beginning of t = 1 as an incumbent …rm. The net surplus created by a manager of talent who is assigned to an incumbent …rm is . Similarly, the net surplus created by a manager of talent assigned to a poacher is . A social planner who wants to maximize social surplus should: (i) replace all managers such that with a random replacement from the outside pool and (ii) assign manager to a poacher if and only if :
(2)
In other words, manager should be matched with a poacher when the incremental surplus to the poacher is larger than the net loss to the incumbent …rm. Condition (2) implies that poaching should occur only if # . We thus conclude that the decentralized equilibrium with symmetric information implements the e¢ cient allocation of talent (i.e., the …rst-best allocation).
Asymmetric Information

Equilibrium: Assumptions and De…nition
We now de…ne the equilibrium conditions under asymmetric information. We …rst de…ne the strategies for incumbents (i.e., …rms at Date 1 of t = 1) and poachers (i.e., H …rms with vacancies at Date 2 of t = 1). We denote an incumbent …rm's strategy by w ji 2 R.
For simplicity, assume that an incumbent would never o¤er a positive wage if it is weakly dominated by o¤ering a negative wage:
The only action of poacher jh (i.e., an H …rm with a vacancy at Date 2 of t = 1) is to o¤er a poaching wage w p jh . When a poacher observes an o¤er w made to a manager, the poacher believes that the manager's talent is distributed according to F W ( j w; i), where i is the type of the incumbent …rm that made the o¤er, and W is the set of all o¤ers made by all incumbent …rms. We represent poachers' strategies by a function, w p jh (w; i; W ). 15 Because poachers compete among themselves in Bertrand fashion, no poacher can have a payo¤ larger than the outside payo¤ . A poacher thus o¤ers
to all managers who hold o¤ers w from incumbent …rms of type i. 16 If w p jh (w; i; W ) < 0, the o¤er is not accepted, implying that a negative poaching wage o¤er is equivalent to no o¤er.
Because the right-hand side of (3) does not depend on jh, for simplicity, we now omit this subscript from function w p .
We use Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) as the equilibrium concept, augmented by some additional restrictions on beliefs. As usual in PBE de…nitions with many players, we assume that all poachers hold identical beliefs F W ( j w; i), both on and o¤ the equilibrium path. Beliefs must be consistent with Bayes's rule on the equilibrium path. We also assume that poachers believe that the incumbent …rms behave independently of one another, speci…-
for all W . We do not need to characterize managers' beliefs because such beliefs do not in ‡uence equilibrium outcomes.
Finally, we also assume the following:
Assumption E2 (Divinity) After observing an o¤-the-equilibrium-path wage w 0 , poachers believe that the probability that an incumbent …rm with a manager of type 0 w 0 i + o¤ers wage w 0 is no less than the probability that a …rm with a manager of type 00 > 0 o¤ers w 0 .
(E2) is a technical assumption that restricts the set of admissible o¤-the-equilibrium-path beliefs. This assumption is an adaptation to our setup of the divinity criterion of Banks and Sobel (1987) . (E2) is not particularly restrictive and is compatible with (in…nitely) many o¤-the-equilibrium-path beliefs; thus, it does not eliminate equilibrium multiplicity. None of our main conclusions depends on this assumption. 17
The role of (E1) and (E2) is to restrict the set of equilibria; thus, they can be interpreted as equilibrium selection criteria. They simplify the analysis signi…cantly, although they do not eliminate equilibrium multiplicity.
Equilibrium: Characterization
We start by proving some preliminary results:
Lemma 1 A …rm o¤ers the same wage to all manager types retained in equilibrium.
This important result has a very simple proof. Suppose that there are two types, and 0 , where 0 > . Suppose that the incumbent …rm wishes to retain both types. Suppose also that w 0 > w (the argument is analogous if w 0 < w). This situation cannot be an equilibrium because there is a pro…table deviation for an incumbent …rm with manager 0 :
The incumbent prefers to o¤er w to a manager of type 0 . Such a manager would nonetheless be retained, although at a lower wage. 17 The intuition for (E2) is as follows. For concreteness, suppose that type 00 is retained by an L …rm in an equilibrium with wage w 00 , while type 0 2 [w 0 + ; 00 ) is not retained (the intuition for the other cases is analogous to this example). An incumbent with a manager of type 00 that deviates and o¤ers this type wage w 0 can bene…t from the deviation only if poachers o¤er w p (w 0 ) w 0 . However, for this set of poaching wages, type 0 would also bene…t from a deviation. Conversely, type 00 would be worse o¤ if w p (w 0 ) > w 0 , whereas type 0 would not be worse o¤. Thus, the logic of Banks and Sobel's divinity criterion requires that the probability of 0 deviating should be no less than that of 00 deviating.
Lemma 2 Any equilibrium must have a threshold property: If an incumbent …rm retains a manager of type , the …rm also retains any manager of type 0 > . This result is again easily proven: For a given retention wage, w, if it is optimal to retain (that is, if i w i ), then it is also optimal to retain any 0 such that 0 .
The next proposition shows that, in equilibrium, incumbent managers will …nd themselves in one of the following three situations: unemployed, employed by their incumbent …rm, or employed by a high-quality poacher. Because of Lemma 2, the very best managers will typically be retained by the incumbent …rm, which implies that, if managers are retained at all, they must be the best managers. In equilibrium, incumbent …rms never retain types < because the unemployment replacement value is higher. Some mediocre types not retained by an incumbent will be either …red or poached. The following proposition provides a complete characterization of the equilibrium. 18
Proposition 2 An equilibrium exists. All equilibria have the following properties:
1. There is a unique~ i 2 [ ; ] such that, for each …rm type i 2 fl; hg, all manager types ~ i are retained. Threshold~ i is the same for all equilibria and is either or the least element of the set of …xed points of
is the wage o¤ered (by both poachers and incumbents) to retained managers whose types are greater than x.
2. All types 2 [0; ] are …red in equilibrium (wages are negative). 4. If 2 P i , then the incumbent …rm o¤ers any w 0
There is a subset of manager types
and F W ( j w 0 i ; i) = F ( j 2 P i ).
To illustrate the intuition behind this proposition, consider a …rm that wants to retain a manager. The …rm knows the manager's general ability. In contrast, competing …rms observe the wage o¤ered by the incumbent employer but not the manager's ability. A high wage is interpreted as a signal of high ability. To prevent the manager from being poached, the incumbent employer must o¤er a su¢ ciently high wage to the manager but will do so only if the manager is indeed very talented. Therefore, only the very best managers are retained.
Because incumbent …rms cannot retain manager types in [ ;~ i ], such managers are either …red or poached. As before, we call these managers mediocre managers, although in some cases, this interval will also include the very best managers (e.g., if~ i is close to or equal to ). There is always an equilibrium with poaching (i.e., P i is non-empty) if~ i > . It is rational for H …rms with vacancies to poach managers with types greater than because these managers are better than the unemployed managers. Firms that poach managers are not fooled in equilibrium and have correct beliefs about the abilities of the managers that they hire. Nonetheless, incumbent …rms are unable to retain such managers at acceptable wages because any attempt to do so would trigger a higher o¤er from poachers, under reasonable o¤-the-equilibrium-path beliefs.
Proposition 2 also reveals that equilibria di¤er from one another (meaningfully) only because the sets P i and S i can di¤er. 19 In the in…nite-horizon version of the model in Section 5, sets P i and S i are uniquely pinned down. However, in the current, simpli…ed, two-period version, we require some additional equilibrium selection criteria to discuss the e¢ ciency properties of the equilibrium. In this case, it is natural to select the most e¢ cient equilibrium as the focal equilibrium: 19 There are multiple combinations of sets P i and S i that constitute di¤erent equilibria, but the set of P i subsets is restricted by condition R 0 dF ( j 2 P i ) > 0. Two observationally equivalent equilibria with the same P i and S i can also di¤er from one another because they are sustained by di¤erent beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path and can display di¤erent wages o¤ered by incumbent …rms for types in P i .
Corollary 1 There is a most e¢ cient equilibrium in which P i = [ ;~ i ] and S i = [ ; ].
We prove the existence of this equilibrium in the proof of Proposition 2. In the most e¢ cient equilibrium, the equilibrium outcome changes monotonically with : As increases, outcomes change from unemployment to job-to-job transition and then from job-to-job transition to staying with the incumbent …rm. This equilibrium is the most e¢ cient one because any other equilibrium must have either some manager with type 0 < being poached, some manager with type 0 > being …red, or both. In the former case, allocational e¢ ciency can be improved by …ring the manager. In the latter case, allocational e¢ ciency can be improved by allowing a poacher to hire the manager.
Since incumbent H …rms cannot retain mediocre managers, in the most e¢ cient equilibrium, managers with types in [ ;~ h ] are not …red but instead move laterally to other H …rms with vacancies. That is, some H …rms poach managers from other H …rms, despite the absence of gains from trade.
Equilibrium: E¢ ciency
The most e¢ cient equilibrium implies that managers with type 2 [~ l ; ] are retained by L …rms, and managers with type 2 [ ;~ l ] move up the job ladder to high-quality …rms. The most e¢ cient equilibrium does not lead to an e¢ cient allocation of talent, which is formally stated in the next corollary. The corollary above shows that asymmetric information creates three distortions relative to the …rst-best scenario. Incumbent …rms do not attempt to retain some managers who are potential poaching targets, leading to excessive turnover. Such turnover results in misallocation of talent because some managers who have acquired …rm-speci…c skills are either ine¢ ciently …red (Case 1) or ine¢ ciently poached by H …rms (Case 2). Thus, in equilibrium, some mediocre managers are poached by high-quality …rms, whereas the best managers stay with their current employers. That is, managers who are poached are adversely selected, which is a key empirical prediction of the model. Finally, L …rms might be too successful in retaining managers who would otherwise be matched with better …rms in the …rst-best allocation. In other words, there might be too much retention in equilibrium (Case 3).
Model Implications and Applications
Here, we discuss some of the empirical implications of the model. Our main result is as follows:
Prediction 1 Firms poach managers who become less productive after switching jobs. This e¤ect is stronger if …rm heterogeneity is low.
This prediction follows from Part 2 of Corollary 2, which shows that there is typically excessive poaching of mediocre types. For some parameters, all poaching is ine¢ cient. This happens, for example, when there is little heterogeneity in …rm quality. Consistent with this prediction, Groysberg, Lee, and Nanda (2008) …nd that the performance of security analysts who are successfully poached by competitors declines after switching employers.
The decline in performance is more pronounced for managers who switch to …rms with similar capabilities, as predicted by our model.
Prediction 2 Firms poach adversely-selected managers.
That is, managers who are retained by their …rms are more talented than managers who are poached by other …rms. Testing this prediction is di¢ cult because of the need for a measure of skill that is observed by the econometrician but not by outside employers. In the context of mutual fund managers, Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) propose a measure of fund manager skill based on returns, fees and assets under management. This measure can be observed ex post but not ex ante. Using such a measure, Berk, van Binsbergen, and Liu (2017) …nd that mutual fund …rms are able to identify their best managers, who are then retained. In contrast, managers who move up the job ladder to larger mutual fund …rms are not as skilled as those who stay. Our model provides a possible explanation for the most puzzling aspect of this evidence, which is that manager ‡ows between mutual fund …rms are adversely selected.
Prediction 3 Firms that retain their incumbent managers perform better than similar …rms that let their managers go.
This prediction is also a consequence of the fact that poached managers are adversely selected. To retain their managers, …rms have to raise the compensation they o¤er. Groen-Xu and Lü (2019) show that salary raises for CEOs positively predict …rm performance.
They interpret their results as evidence that boards privately learn information about the productivity of their CEOs.
Consider now the additional result:
Corollary 3 H …rms pay higher wages on average than L …rms.
That is, in equilibrium, di¤erent types of …rms pay di¤erent average wages such that high (low)-quality …rms are also high (low)-wage …rms, leading to the following prediction.
Prediction 4 Job-to-job ‡ows are typically from (i) low-quality …rms to high-quality …rms and (ii) low-wage …rms to high-wage …rms.
Part (i) follows from the fact that, in equilibrium, only H …rms can be successful poachers.
Part (ii) then follows from Corollary 3. This prediction implies the existence of productivity and wage job ladders. We are unaware of empirical evidence of such job ladders in the speci…c context of …nance jobs. and Haltiwanger, Hyatt, Kahn, and McEntarfer (2018) show evidence of such job ladders using cross-industry data.
To perform comparative statics, we need to assume the existence of an interior solution.
The following condition guarantees an interior solution (i.e.,~ l < ): 20 For the comparative statics, we initially focus on two parameters with intuitive interpretations. The …rst is , which could be interpreted as the (cross-sectional) measure of …rm heterogeneity. The second parameter, , measures the importance of general skills relative to …rm-speci…c skills.
It is immediate from (4) and (5) that has no e¤ect on e h . However, does a¤ect~ l .
By the implicit function theorem, we …nd the following: 21
> 0:
That is, the retention threshold for L …rms increases with …rm heterogeneity . Intuitively, as L and H …rms become more heterogeneous, L …rms …nd it increasingly di¢ cult to retain managers and are thus able to retain only the very best managers. We then have the following prediction:
Prediction 5 The quality of poached managers improves with …rm heterogeneity.
Result (7) also implies~ l >~ h , which then implies the following three predictions:
Prediction 6 Managers who stay with low-quality …rms are on average better than managers who stay with high-quality …rms.
Prediction 7 Managers who leave low-quality …rms are on average better than managers who leave high-quality …rms.
Prediction 8 Low-quality …rms experience greater turnover of managers than high-quality …rms.
Intuitively, low-quality …rms are more concerned about the threat of poaching because they are competing with …rms that value manager talent more and o¤er higher wages. Thus, low-quality …rms are willing to compete only for the very best managers; consequently, more of their managers leave. Consistent with Prediction 8, Haltiwanger, Hyatt, and McEntarfer (2018) provide evidence that low-quality …rms experience greater turnover of employees.
Our model also has predictions for managerial compensation. Consider, for example, w i , which is the wage paid to managers retained by i …rms. From (5) and (7) we have
Prediction 9 Compensation for retained managers increases with …rm heterogeneity.
Our model shares Prediction 9 with models of competitive assignment under symmetric information, such as Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Terviö (2008) . In our model, wages increase with for two reasons. First, an increase in makes managers more valuable to H …rms; thus, H …rms are willing to pay more for a manager with a given ability . To prevent poaching, incumbent …rms then o¤er higher retention wages. This e¤ect applies to both H and L …rms. Such forces are also present in competitive assignment models with symmetric information. Second, an increase in changes the retention threshold for L …rms (see (7)). As the average retained type increases, the retention wage also increases.
This second e¤ect applies only to L …rms. This e¤ect is unique to competitive models with asymmetric information.
If a manager is …rst hired with a zero wage (as would happen if, for example, they could not be paid negative wages), then the retention wage measures the increase in earnings for those managers who are retained by their …rms. Thus, we obtain the following result:
Prediction 10 Within-job wage growth increases with …rm heterogeneity.
In the context of knowledge workers, Andersson et al. (2009) study compensation patterns in a number of sectors of the software industry. They …nd that sectors in which there is greater dispersion in potential payo¤s (e.g., di¤erences in productivity) o¤er higher earnings growth for employees who are retained by their …rms.
The e¤ect of the importance of general skills relative to …rm-speci…c skills is inferred from
(10) implies the following:
Prediction 11 Managerial turnover increases with the relative importance of general skills.
Again, this prediction is intuitive. There is more poaching when general skills are more important (i.e., when skills are more portable). An increase in the poaching of managers from H …rms is always ine¢ cient. An increase in the poaching of managers from L …rms can be either e¢ cient or ine¢ cient. Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013) show that general skills are positively related to CEO turnover. Frydman (2016) argues that an increase in the importance of general managerial skills can explain higher levels of managerial mobility in recent years.
It is also interesting to study the impact of changes in the distribution of talent on job mobility. In particular, we consider the e¤ect of the skewness of the distribution of talent on mobility. One possible measure of skewness is
; for x > :
To see this, suppose that the distribution of talent changes in a way that keeps the mean constant but increases E [ j x] for all x . This could happen, for example, if increases, while some density weight from the right of the mean is shifted to the left of the mean (to keep the mean constant). Thus, the distribution of talent becomes more positively skewed. Skewness in talent and compensation is associated with existence of superstars (Rosen, 1981) . The increasing importance of superstar managers can thus be modeled as an increase in : A large indicates the existence of very few managers with talent much above the average. We then have
where d is an informal notation for an increase in (x) for all x while keeping constant. As the "right-tail dispersion" of talent increases, it becomes more expensive to retain the best managers; consequently, fewer of them are retained in equilibrium.
Prediction 12 Managerial turnover increases with the skewness of the distribution of talent.
An In…nite-Horizon Model
We now develop an in…nite-horizon version of the model. This version delivers two new results. First, discovering talent is a real option available to …rms: Firms hire young managers hoping to retain them once their talent is revealed. Second, …rms bene…t from their role as talent discoverers, because they can now extract some of the surplus that accrues to managers who are poached.
The economy is populated with many in…nitely lived …rms. Again, …rms can be of one of two types, L or H, representing both the type and the mass of …rms of each type. Managers live for two periods: young age and old age. Firms and managers are risk-neutral and share a common discount factor 2 [0; 1). At each period t (t = 0; 1; 2; :::), a mass M of young managers enter the labor market. For brevity, we do not present the benchmark case of symmetric information; a full analysis of this case can be found in the Internet Appendix.
At the beginning of a period, a …rm can be in one of the following states:
(i) The …rm has a vacant position because its manager retired at the end of the previous period (that is, the manager was old).
(ii) The …rm does not have a vacant position because its manager was young in the previous period.
Both types of …rms can have incumbent managers and can also become poachers. In each period t, the timing of actions for a …rm with an incumbent manager is exactly as described in Section 2. At Date 2 in period t, a type-h …rm can attempt to poach a manager from a type-l …rm or from another type-h …rm. In general, we also allow type-l …rms to make poaching o¤ers. However, for simplicity, we (implicitly) restrict our analysis to a set of parameters for which, in equilibrium, managers would strictly prefer poaching o¤ers from type-h …rms. Thus, without loss of generality, we assume that type-l …rms cannot poach managers.
As above, there could be a subset P i of types poached in equilibrium and a subset S i of types …red in equilibrium. For simplicity, we focus only on cases in which both P i and S i are convex sets; that is, they are intervals, which means that, if type is poached, then type
In a monotonic equilibrium, in each period we need to …nd two types of thresholds. As discussed above,~ i , i 2 fl; hg, denotes the threshold such that all types ~ i are retained.
We de…ne^ i as the threshold for which all types ^ i are …red. Each monotonic equilibrium has a unique sequence of thresholds f~ l ;~ h ;^ l ;^ h g t ; t = 0; 1; ::; 1. For simplicity, we focus only on equilibria in which these thresholds are time-invariant. Thus, we can omit the time subscript from the analysis that follows. Now, at Date 4 in each period t, …rms with vacancies o¤er wage w y i , i 2 fl; hg, to unemployed young managers. Thus, we also need to determine such wages in equilibrium.
We assume that …rms can o¤er any wage that they want, including negative wages. Managers may accept negative wages when young if, by working for the …rm, they can earn higher wages when old. Later, we brie ‡y discuss the e¤ects of relaxing this assumption. To select among possible equilibria, we assume that, at Date 4, …rms publicly announce a threshold i . We assume that all players (i.e., …rms and managers) share the same beliefs on and o¤ the equilibrium path, and beliefs are such that players expect incumbent …rms to use threshold^ i if this threshold is announced (that is, we select truth-telling as an equilibrium re…nement). This belief is rational because incumbent …rms are indi¤erent with respect to which threshold^ i they use after the announcement.
Proposition 3 A unique monotonic equilibrium with time-invariant thresholds f~ l ;~ h ;^ l ;^ h g and wages fw y l ; w y h ; w l ; w h ; w (~ l ); w (~ h )g exists and has the following properties: 22
1. For any given pair (^ l ;^ h ), there is a unique~ i such that, for each …rm type i 2 fl; hg, all manager types ~ i are retained. Threshold~ i is either or the least element of the set of …xed points of
2. For any given pair (^ l ;^ h ), equilibrium wages are such that all retained managers are o¤ered w (x) = max
all managers who are poached (if any) are paid
and all young managers who agree to work for a type-i …rm are o¤ered wage
3. At Date 4, type-i …rms with vacancies announce the threshold^ i that maximizes the present value of their expected pro…ts given (13), (14), (15) and (16). 4. All types i 2 [0;^ i ] are …red in equilibrium (wages are negative).
From this proposition we conclude that the equilibrium displays the same type of talent misallocation as in the two-period model: The best types [~ i ; ] are retained and the mediocre types [^ i ;~ i ] are poached. Thus, our main conclusions continue to hold in the in…nite-horizon model.
The in…nite-horizon version of the model di¤ers from the two-period model in two important ways. First, hiring a young manager is a real option for the …rm. When a …rm hires a young manager in period t, it will learn the type of this manager in period t + 1. Because learning is asymmetric, the incumbent bene…ts from its informational advantage and is thus able to extract some of the surplus from managers with su¢ ciently high ability. This option value reduces …rms'incentives to become poachers.
Second, in the in…nite-horizon model, unlike the two-period model, …rms bene…t from their role as talent discoverers because incumbent …rms can now extract some of the surplus that accrues to managers who are poached when they are old by o¤ering such managers less than their outside wage when they are young. Thus, when hiring young managers, …rms choose the threshold^ i that maximizes the surplus that they can extract from managers; the solution to this maximization is unique (which uniquely pins down sets P i and S i ).
The main implication of the combination of these two new features is that, as long as the discount factor is su¢ ciently low, any equilibrium must involve poaching. This contrasts with the two-period case, in which an equilibrium with poaching is one of many possible equilibria. In the in…nite-horizon case, poaching will necessarily occur in equilibrium even when there is an exogenous lower bound on wages (such as a limited liability constraint), provided that this bound is not too high.
Final Remarks
In knowledge-based industries and sectors, …rms play an important role as talent discoverers.
Competition for talent implies that …rms may not capture most of the value that they help create. Why would …rms invest in talent discovery when they face …erce competition for their best managers?
In our model, …rms asymmetrically learn about the abilities of their managers. This knowledge gives …rms informational rents, helping to explain …rms' incentives to invest in talent discovery. Because of their informational advantage, …rms that invest in talent discovery are able to retain their best managers. In equilibrium, …rms specialize in either discovering talent or poaching talent from other …rms. Poachers hire mediocre managers, i.e., those who are above average but not stars. In equilibrium, poachers chase lemons: Poached managers are adversely selected with respect to the set of employed managers. However, because talent-discovering …rms act as certi…ers of talent, poached managers are positively selected relative to the population of managers.
A. Appendix: Proofs
Proposition 1.
Proof. Suppose an H …rm has a vacancy at Date 2. Because of (A2), poachers are in excess supply, thus poachers compete à la Bertrand and their pro…ts from poaching a manager with talent must be equal to their outside payo¤. The poaching wage o¤ered to type is given by
where the superscript S denotes symmetric information. 23
In a subgame perfect equilibrium, incumbent …rm ji solves max w2R ji (w), where
Suppose …rst that ji . In this case, the …rm does not have to worry about poaching and will pay w ji = 0 if ji 2 [ ; ] and some w ji < 0 if ji < (in other words, it dismisses the manager).
If instead ji > and the …rm wants to retain the manager, then it must o¤er at least as much as a poacher, that is, w ji must be equal to or greater than ( ji ) > 0. Then, ji's payo¤ is ji = i ji ( ji ), which implies that retaining the manager is an optimal choice if and only if i ji ( ji ) i . If i = h, this condition holds always, thus implying that, in equilibrium, no manager is poached from an H …rm. An H …rm's optimal strategy regarding its incumbent manager is summarized by: 24
Now the analysis that follows refers to L …rms only. If 1, condition jl ( jl )
is true for any jl > (recall that > 1). If > 1, this condition holds for any jl ( 1) = ( 1). This reasoning implies that an L …rm's optimal strategy is to o¤er w S jl = 8 > > > > > < > > > > > :
Proposition 2.
Proof. Part 1: From Lemma 2, we know that an equilibrium must have a threshold~ i above which all manager types are retained by incumbent …rms of type i. Here we want to …nd the value for~ i .
From Lemma 1 we know that all types i in [~ i ; ] are paid the same wage; let w denote such a wage. To retain such managers, an incumbent …rm must o¤er w w p (w ; i; W ),
where function w p denotes the wage o¤ered by poachers when they observe an incumbent …rm of type i that o¤ers a wage w when the set of all equilibrium wage o¤ers is W . Upon observing w , beliefs must be F ( j ~ i ), which implies that the poaching wage is given by (here we use (A2) and Bertrand competition among poachers):
Consider an incumbent …rm of type i with a manager of type i 2 [~ i ; ]. For w to be an equilibrium wage o¤er, the incumbent …rm must be better o¤ by retaining the manager at this wage rather than hiring a new manager from the outside pool:
If the inequality above is strict, then there exists 0 <~ such that 0 > w i + such that the incumbent …rm would like to retain the manager at wage w , which contradicts the assumption that~ i is an equilibrium threshold. Thus, it must be that
We now show that w = w p (w ; i; W ). Suppose …rst that w > w p (w ; i; W ) and consider a deviation from an incumbent with a manager of type i >~ i who chooses to o¤er w p (w ; i; W ) instead of w . For this not to constitute a pro…table deviation, it must be that the manager rejects the incumbent …rm's o¤er, that is the following condition needs to hold:
that is,
This can only happen if distribution F W puts more more weight on higher manager types than distribution F ( j ~ i ). Formally, this requires that there exists at least one manager
for which the probability of deviation of an incumbent …rm is strictly greater than the probability of a deviation of an incumbent …rm with a manager of type 0 2 (~ i ; 00 ). However, this is ruled out by (E2). Thus, it must be that w = w p (w ; i; W ), thus the equilibrium threshold must satisfy the following condition:
This condition is necessary, but not su¢ cient, and there may be multiple values of~ i that solve this equation. Another necessary condition for an equilibrium is that
for " > 0 arbitrarily small. To see this, suppose that
then the incumbent would be better o¤ by not retaining types in the interval [~ i ;~ i + "] ;
which contradicts the assumption that~ i is an equilibrium threshold.
De…ne the function x G i (x) 0:
This condition always holds if the incumbent is an H …rm (i.e., i = ), but it may or may not hold if the incumbent is an L …rm (i.e., i = 1). If (32) does not hold, the unique equilibrium displays no retention by L …rms, that is,~ l = :
Assuming that (32) holds, we de…ne the least element of the set of …xed points of G i (x):
Since G i (x) for all x 0, we have that x i .
We now show that x i is an equilibrium threshold. First, notice that setting~ i = x i satis…es (28) because x i is a …xed point of G i (:). Second, because G i (0) > 0, x G i (x) crosses zero from below at x i , which satis…es condition (29).
Now we show that no other …xed point of G i (x) that also satis…es (29) and such that
x > x i can be an equilibrium. Suppose that there is a candidate equilibrium threshold
x 0 > x i such that only types x 0 are retained at wage
Then, an incumbent …rm with a manager of type x i + ", with " > 0 arbitrarily small, could deviate and o¤er w i < w 0 , with
If a manager of type x i + " is successfully retained at wage w i , then the incumbent …rm is strictly better o¤. For such a deviation not to be pro…table, poachers'beliefs must be such that w p (w i ; i; W ) > w i . This would occur if poachers believe that …rms with managers with better types are more likely to deviate than those with worse types. Formally, this requires that there exists at least one manager type 00 > x w i i + for which the probability of deviation of an incumbent …rm is strictly greater than the probability of a deviation of an incumbent …rm with a manager of type 0 2 (x i ; 00 ). However, this is ruled out by (E2).
Thus, x i is the unique equilibrium threshold; i.e.~ i = x i . The unique retention wage is given by w i as in (35).
Part 2 . It follows trivially from (E1).
Part 3 . Suppose that there is some type 0 i in [ ;~ i ] that is retained in equilibrium. Lemma 2 implies that all types in [ 0 i ;~ i ] are also retained, and Lemma 1 implies that all types in [ 0 i ; ] must be paid the same wage. However, because 0 i ~ i , then by the de…nition of~ i in (33), we have 0 i G i ( 0 i ) 0. Thus, type 0 i cannot be pro…tably retained. Thus, all types in [ ;~ i ] must be either poached (and thus included in set P i ) or …red (and thus included in set S i ). Since a manager only accepts an o¤er from a poacher if that o¤er is positive, for any set P i it must be that R 0 xdF ( j i 2 P i ) > 0 (at least one equilibrium with P i 6 = ? exists if~ i > ). Thus, if an equilibrium exists, Part 3 must hold.
Part 4. If i 2 P i , then the incumbent must o¤er the managers in this set some wage w 0 i that is lower than the poaching wage w p (w 0 i ; i; W ). Because poachers' beliefs must be Bayesian on the equilibrium path, then
and poachers'beliefs are given by F W ( j w 0 i ; i) = F ( j i 2 P i ) To complete the proof, we only need to show that at least one equilibrium exists. Suppose …rst that max l 2[0; ) l G l ( l ) > 0. In this case, we know that there exists a unique pair f~ l ;~ h g < f ; g. The following fully characterizes one possible equilibrium:
Consider the retention wages
the poaching wages on the equilibrium path
and beliefs such that F ( j w i i + ) for any w i that is o¤ the equilibrium path. In this equilibrium, P i = [ ;~ i ] and S i = [ ; ] :
If we have max l 2[0; ) l G l ( l ) 0, nothing is changed for H …rms. For L …rms, no type l is retained, and an equilibrium in which all types l are o¤ered w l = 0, and types below are …red, exists and is sustained by beliefs such that F ( j w l + ) for any w l that is o¤ the equilibrium path. This equilibrium implies P l = [ ; ] and S l = [ ; ] :
Corollary 3
Proof. Equilibrium average wages in L …rms are given by
and equilibrium average wages in those H …rms that do not poach any manager are
Since
and because~ l >~ h (this is implied by (7)), w a h > w a l for those H …rms that do not poach managers. H …rms that poach managers o¤er positive wages to those managers, which implies that their average wage is higher than w a h . Proposition 3 Proof. To prove Part 1, we need to …nd the unique pair f~ l ;~ h g conditional on a given pair of equilibrium thresholds f^ l ;^ h g, which for now we take as givens. Because many of the steps are similar to those in the proof of Proposition 2, we refer the reader to that proof in some instances.
Lemma 2 implies that an equilibrium with retention must have a threshold~ i . Lemma 1 implies that all types in [~ i ; ] are paid the same wage. To prevent poaching, this wage must be such that w (~ i ) w p (w (~ i )), where w p (w (~ i )) is the wage o¤ered by poachers who observe w (~ i ) (w p (:) will be derived below). Because poachers know that all types in
The poaching wage o¤ered by a type-h …rm with a vacant position is implicitly determined by the following condition:
and
From equations (44) and (45), we obtain:
The poaching wage o¤ered by a type-h …rm upon observing w (~ i ) is
: (47) Using this poaching wage, we can now proceed exactly as in the proof of Proposition 2 to show that w (~ i ) = max fw p (w (~ i )); 0g if the equilibrium threshold is~ i for i 2 fl; hg. 25 25 Formally, we need to modify Assumption E2 slightly to …t the dynamic setup: After observing an o¤-theequilibrium-path wage w 0 i , poachers believe that the probability that type 0 w 0 i + i w y i + (V o i V y i ) deviates is no less than the probability that type 00 > 0 deviates. The application of this equilibrium re…nement thus depends on some other equilibrium values (w y i , V o i , and V y i ); this creates no di¢ culties as the condition can always be checked for each candidate equilibrium.
Solving it for w (~ h ), we obtain (after some algebra)
which can be plugged into (47) to …nd w (~ l ):
(1 ) f ( )d ; 0 :
Because w (~ i ) = max fw p (w (~ i )); 0g, a necessary condition for an incumbent type-i …rm with a manager with type 2 [~ i ; ] not to deviate and …re the manager is:
where
Hence, after some rearranging, condition (50) becomes:
The wage w i o¤ered by poachers (i.e. type-h …rms) to managers from type-i …rm with talent 2 [^ i ;~ i ] is determined by the following condition (from Bertrand competition):
We use equations (44) and (45) to derive the wage for those managers who are poached (by h …rms) in equilibrium:
(1 ) f ( )d :
From young managers'participation constraint, we obtain:
We now characterize the thresholds and wages o¤ered by type-h …rms only. From (54) and (48), the condition for a type-h …rm becomes:
At e h = 0; this condition does not hold. If e h = ; then we have > 0 because < 1. Thus, by continuity, there is at least one threshold such this condition holds with equality. By the same arguments as in Proposition 2, the lowest of such tresholds is the unique equilibrium value for~ h . Note that~ h is exactly the same as in the static case and depends only on and F (:). In particular,~ h is indepedent of f^ l ;^ h g.
We now characterize the wages o¤ered by h-…rms when there is strictly positive poaching (w y h ; w h ; w (~ h )):
We can express w y h as a function of thresholds f~ h ;^ h g
(1 ) f ( )d ;
which can be plugged into (59) and (60) (1 ) f ( )d :
A type-h …rm with a vacancy announces threshold b h ; we assume that all players (i.e., …rms and managers) share the same beliefs, on and o¤ the equilibrium path, and beliefs are such that players expect incumbent …rms to use threshold^ h if this threshold is announced.
Given such beliefs, the announcement of b h pins down w y h as given by (62) (recall that e h is uniquely determined by (58)). Note that a …rm that announces^ h at period t has no incentives to deviate and play a di¤erent threshold^ 0 h 6 =^ h at period t + 1, because at t + 1 the …rm is unable to retain any type below e h and thus the …rm is indi¤erent between any two thresholds^ 0 h and^ h . A type-h …rm chooses^ h 2 [0; e h ] to maximize its expected pro…t (64). A solution exists because of continuity and the fact that [0; e h ] is a closed interval. The solution^ h is (generically) unique because the expected pro…t is di¤erentiable with respect to^ h in the interior of [0; e h ]. Now that we have determined a (generically) unique set of equilibrium thresholds for h …rms fb h ; e h g, we can …nd the equilibrium thresholds for l …rms. For each b l , de…ne the function:
with domain over 2 [b l ; ], where w ( ) = max
w y l = (1 F ( ))w ( ) (F ( ) F (^ l )) max fw l ; 0g :
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